Publications in Peer-Reviewed Academic Journals

Huber, Martin, Mark Schelker and Anthony Strittmatter (forthcoming). Direct and Indirect Effects Based on Changes-in-Changes. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, forthcoming. linkOnline AppendixCESifo Working Paper No. 7855  

Berset, Simon and Mark Schelker (2020). Fiscal Windfall Curse. European Economic Review, 130, 103592. linkOnline AppendixCESifo Working Paper No. 7795 

Deuchert Eva, Martin Huber and Mark Schelker (2019). Direct and Indirect Effects Based on Difference-in-Differences with an Application to Political Preferences Following the Vietnam Draft Lottery. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 37 (4): 710-720. linkCESifo Working Paper No. 6000

Schelker, Mark (2018) Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable. Journal of Comparative Economics, 46 (1): 131-144. link / Online Appendix /  CESifo Working Paper No. 3523

Schelker, Mark and Marco Schneiter (2017). The Elasticity of Voter Turnout: Investing 85 Cents per Voter to Increase Voter Turnout by 4 Percent. Electoral Studies, 49: 65-74. link / Online Appendix / CESifo Working Paper No. 5617

Lüchinger, Simon, Mark Schelker and Alois Stutzer (2014). Governance, Bureaucratic Rents and Well-Being Differentials Across U.S. States. Oxford Economic Papers 66 (2): 443-464. link

Schelker, Mark (2013). Auditors and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Public Sector. Kyklos 66 (2): 275-300. link

Schelker, Mark (2012). Auditor Expertise: Evidence from the Public Sector. Economics Letters 116 (3): 432-435. link

Schelker, Mark (2012). The Influence of Auditor Term Length and Term Limits on US State General Obligation Bond Ratings. Public Choice 150 (1): 27-49. link

Kirchgässner, Gebhard and Mark Schelker (2011). Federalism and Exit Costs. Constitutional Political Economy 22: 191-197. link

Schelker, Mark and Reiner Eichenberger (2010). Auditors and Fiscal Policy: Empirical Evidence on a Little Big Institution. Journal of Comparative Economics 38 (4): 357-380. link

Eichenberger, Reiner and Mark Schelker (2007). Independent and Competing Agencies: An Effective Way to Control Government. Public Choice 130: 79-98. link

Schelker, Mark and Reiner Eichenberger (2003). Starke Rechnungsprüfungskommissionen: Wichtiger als direkte Demokratie und Föderalismus? Ein erster Blick auf die Daten. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 139 (3): 351-373. link