Abstract:
It is commonly held that Kant's account of existence foreshadows Frege's, Russell's, and Quine's disdain for non-existent objects. This interpretation has consequences for the interpretation of Kant's modal metaphysics because it excludes attributing an ontology of merely possible objects (possibilia) to Kant. Consequently, it has become standard in the literature to deflate Kant's talk of merely possible objects, reducing them to features of the content of judgments. I oppose this line of interpretation and attribute a pivotal role to an ontology of possibilia beyond mere intentional objects to Kant. In this talk, I'll offer a negative and positive argument for my interpretation. The negative argument criticises the claim that Kant's account of existence implies the impossibility of non-existent objects. The positive argument shows that Kantian possibilia exceed our representational capacities in determinacy, which is why they cannot be mere intentional objects.