

THE ANALOGIA ENTIS AS A STANDARD OF CATHOLIC ENGAGEMENT: ERICH PRZYWARA'S CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY

JOHN R. BETZ

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to introduce the reader to the twentieth-century Jesuit, Erich Przywara (1889-1972), who was arguably the most brilliant and prolific Catholic philosopher, theologian, cultural and literary critic of the 1920s and 1930s, but is known today more by association with his friend Edith Stein or his protégé Hans Urs von Balthasar than for anything he wrote. Rather than focusing on any single work, however, this article focuses on his early understanding of the *analogia entis* as a synthesis of the teaching of Augustine, Thomas, and the IV Lateran Council, and on his subsequent deployment of the *analogia entis* as a Catholic standard in response to the dialectical theology of the early Barth and the phenomenology of Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger, respectively. Looking back to Vatican I and anticipating Vatican II, it is clear that Przywara was in the vanguard of the Catholic Church's engagement with the modern world. What remains to be considered today, aside from his immense contribution to modern theology, is the merit of his responses to Barth and Heidegger at this time, e.g., his claim that dialectical theology, instead of being a corrective to modernity, was only a symptom of its fundamental imbalance, and that phenomenology, rather than overcoming or displacing a Catholic metaphysics of the *analogia entis*, is fulfilled in the ontological openness signified by it.

Introduction

If we had just a few more far-seeing spirits [*weit ausschauende Geister*] like this fine thinker Erich Przywara, the hero of the famous academic congress in Ulm in 1923, all the contemporary problems on the philosophical front could be energized from a Catholic standpoint.

Peter Wust¹

John R. Betz
University of Notre Dame, Department of Theology, 233 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA
Email: jbetz4@nd.edu.

¹ Quoted in Wilhelm Spael, *Das katholische Deutschland im 20. Jahrhundert. Seine Pionier- und Krisenzeiten* (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1964), 261.

In the history of ideas it is not unknown for great philosophers and theologians to be overlooked and even forgotten. Sometimes this is a function of the high intellectual demands of the thinker in question. Sometimes it is a function of form, which is to say, an idiosyncratic or insufficiently popular style. Sometimes it is a function of the philosophy or theology à la mode, which deter one from investigating figures of the past – especially one whose corpus of writings is at once so monumental and diverse, like a “rugged, imposing mountain range” [*ein zerklüftet widerständiges Gebirg*], that one does not know exactly where – if anywhere – to begin.² And sometimes, in the most poignant examples, it is a function of all these factors. Such is the case with the remarkable Jesuit philosopher, theologian, poet, and critic Erich Przywara, S. J. (1889–1972), who was perhaps the most prolific, brilliant, and erudite German Catholic theologian of the first half of the twentieth century, and uniquely suited to address the intellectual confusion and crises of the time,³ but who is virtually unknown today except by association, whether with the concept of the *analogia entis*, or with friends he mentored such as Edith Stein and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Indeed, he had such a formative influence during the 1920s and 1930s that the Catholic philosopher Lorenz Bruno Puntel could say in 1969, “One cannot understand the history of Christian philosophy and theology of the last forty years in German-speaking countries apart from his work,” which makes it “all the more striking that only a few appeal to his thought today.”⁴

To be sure, fifty years later things have changed somewhat. Indeed, given Pope Francis’s mention of Przywara upon the occasion of his reception of the Charlemagne Prize in 2016, and Rowan Williams’s generous reception of Przywara in *Christ, the Heart*

² See Martha Zechmeister, *Gottes-Nacht: Erich Przywaras Weg negativer Theologie* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2000), 6.

³ As Joachim Negel observes in light of the chaotic intellectual scene of the 1920s and the unique challenges it posed: “In such a confusing situation as this, in order even remotely to maintain a commanding perspective, it is obvious that one would have to have not only an analytically acute understanding and a seismographic power of intuition, but also a power of reasoning capable of such a complex synopsis. Moreover, if one understands oneself as a *theologian* committed to the tradition of the Church, one would have to be prepared to read the tradition in light of the times and the times in light of the tradition. In other words, it requires the capacity for stereophonic hearing: the more one reads Simmel and Husserl, Nietzsche and Freud, Bergson and Blondel, the more one has to read, at the same time, Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Thomas, Luther and Kierkegaard, Kant and Hegel. This was precisely the time – the *kairos* – for Erich Przywara.” [“Es liegt auf der Hand, dass, um in einer solchen verwirrenden Situation auch nur einigermaßen den Überblick zu behalten, es nicht nur eines analytisch scharfen Verstandes und eines seismographischen Intuitionsvermögens, sondern auch einer der komplexen Zusammenschau fähigen Vernunft bedarf. Wo man sich ... darüberhinaus aber als ein der kirchlichen Tradition verpflichteter *Theologe* stellen will, ist zusätzlich die Bereitschaft erforderlich, die Tradition im Spiegel der Gegenwart und die Gegenwart im Spiegel der Tradition zu lesen. Gefordert ist m.a.W. die Fähigkeit zum stereophonen Hören: je mehr man Simmel und Husserl, Nietzsche und Freud, Bergson und Blondel liest, umso mehr muss man zugleich Platon und Aristoteles, Augustinus und Thomas, Luther und Kierkegaard, Kant und Hegel lesen...Eben dies war die Stunde von Erich Przywara.”] See Joachim Negel, “Nichts ist Wirklicher als Gott. Erich Przywaras Versuch, im Angesicht menschlicher Unheilsgeschichte den Gott biblischer Heilsgeschichte zu denken,” in *Urkatastrophe: Die Erfahrung des Krieges 1914–1918 im Spiegel zeitgenössischer Theologie*, edited by Joachim Negel and Karl Pinggéra (Freiburg: Herder, 2016), 178.

⁴ Lorenz Bruno Puntel, *Analogie und Geschichtlichkeit*, vol. 1, *Philosophiegeschichtlich-kritischer Versuch über das Grundproblem der Metaphysik* (Freiburg: Herder, 1969), 149.

of *Creation* (2018), it would not be far-fetched to speak of a “Przywara renaissance.”⁵ But the foregoing claims about his significance might still seem extravagant – even to those familiar with the German theological tradition. In order to make sense of them, therefore, let us first recall some of the highlights of Przywara’s exceedingly productive career. Ordained in 1920, he was soon lecturing widely: in 1923 in Ulm, alongside the older Karl Adam and Romano Guardini; between 1924 and 1926 in Whylen, where he taught, among others, Josef Pieper; and most famously at the Davos seminar in 1928 and 1929, alongside Cassirer and Heidegger. In 1922 he produced with his confrère Otto Karrer the first German edition of Newman’s works. Around the same time, he was one of the first Catholic theologians to engage phenomenology, in particular the work of Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger, publishing his first monograph on the foundations of religion in Scheler and Newman in 1923. On the personal front he was a friend and mentor of Edith Stein, guiding her early studies and translations of Thomas and Newman, and likely influencing her decision to enter the Carmelite Order. On the ecumenical front, aside from authoring one of the first Catholic studies of Kierkegaard, *Das Geheimnis Kierkegaards* (1929), he was the most important Catholic interlocutor of Karl Barth (in Barth’s own estimation), visiting Barth’s seminars in 1929 and 1931. In 1932 he published his magnum opus, *Analogia Entis*, which proved foundational to the young Balthasar.⁶ Subsequent works include collections of poetry, *Karmel* (1932), *Homo* (1933), and *Hymnus* (1936); a topical anthology of Augustine’s writings, which included a monograph-length introduction to Augustine as the father of the West, entitled *Augustinus: Die Gestalt als Gefüge* (1934); several works engaging the existential unrest of the time, including *Christliche Existenz* (1934) and *Heroisch* (1936); a massive three-volume commentary on Ignatius’ *Spiritual Exercises*, entitled *Deus Semper Maior* (1938); and, finally, as his answer to the pending catastrophe – and to Nietzsche – *Crucis Mysterium* (1939).

⁵ For recent work in English, in addition to Thomas O’Meara’s *Erich Przywara, S. J.: His Theology and His World* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002) and the English translation of the 1962 edition of Przywara’s *Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm*, trans. John Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014), see the final of Rowan Williams’s 2016 Hulsean lectures, “Christ and the Logic of Creation,” and his essay, “Dialectic and Analogy: A Theological Legacy,” in *The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought*, edited by Nicholas Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 274–92. See also Kenneth Oakes, “Three Themes in Przywara’s Earlier Thought,” *The Thomist* 74, no. 2 (April 2010): 283–310; Brian Dunkle, S. J., “Service in the *Analogia Entis* and Spiritual Works of Erich Przywara,” *Theological Studies* 73 (2012): 339–62; Mogård Bergem, “Transgressions: Erich Przywara, G. W. F. Hegel, and the Principle of Non-Contradiction,” *Forum Philosophicum* 21, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 11–27; John Betz, “Erich Przywara and the *Analogia Entis*: A Genealogical Diagnosis and Metaphysical Critique of Modernity,” in *Christian Wisdom Meets Modernity*, edited by Balázs Mezei, Francesca Murphy, and Kenneth Oakes (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 71–91; Jonathan M. Ciraulo, “Deification as Christification in Erich Przywara and John Zizoulas,” *Modern Theology* 32, no. 4 (October 2016): 479–503; and, most recently, Aaron Pidel, S. J., *The Church of the Ever Greater God: The Ecclesiology of Erich Przywara, SJ*, PhD dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2017. Among recent work in German, in addition to Martha Zechmeister’s pioneering study, see: Karl-Heinz Wiesemann, *Zerspringender Akkord: Das Zusammenspiel von Theologie und Mystik bei Karl Adam Romano Guardini und Erich Przywara als theologische Fuge* (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 2000), 274–404; Eva-Maria Faber, “Künder der lebendigen Nähe des unbegreiflichen Gottes. Hans Urs von Balthasar und sein ‘Mentor’ Erich Przywara,” in *Die Kunst Gottes verstehen. Hans Urs von Balthasars theologische Provokationen* (Freiburg: Herder, 2005), 384–409; Joachim Negel, “Nichts ist Wirklicher als Gott,” 176–226; idem, *Ambivalentes Opfer* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2005), 123–48; Peter Lüning, *Der Mensch im Angesicht des Gekreuzigten. Untersuchungen zum Kreuzesverständnis von Erich Przywara, Karl Rahner, Jon Sobrino und Hans Urs von Balthasar* (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2006), 29–118; Christian Lagger, *Dienst: Kenosis in Schöpfung und Kreuz bei Erich Przywara SJ* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 2007).

⁶ Werner Löser makes this point very clearly. See his *Geschenkte Wahrheit. Annäherungen an das Werk Hans Urs von Balthasars* (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 2015), reviewed by John Betz, *Theologische Revue* 113 (2017): 501–04.

After the Second World War, though his health was in decline, Przywara continued to publish important works, including *Was ist Gott? Summula* (1947), *Vier Predigten über das Abendland* (1948), *Nuptiae Agni* (1948), *Hölderlin* (1952), *Humanitas* (1952), *Christentum gemäß Johannes* (1954), and *Alter und Neuer Bund* (1956) – the last of which was reviewed by Joseph Ratzinger, who described it as “masterful” and as possessing a “salutary sobriety.”⁷ He also gave a series of radio talks for the *Südwestdeutsche Runkfunk*, some of which were collected in a volume entitled, *In und Gegen. Stellungnahmen zur Zeit* (1955), and by the end of the decade he published another monumental work, *Mensch. Typologische Anthropologie* (1959). On the whole, however, his influence waned as he withdrew more and more from public and even Jesuit community life – retiring in his final years to the tiny village of Hagen in the vicinity of Murnau, leaving by the time of his death a corpus of over forty books and well over 800 articles and reviews, little of which has ever been studied.

But he was never forgotten, at least not by John Paul II, who in 1980 in an address to theologians at Altötting named him among the great theologians of the German Catholic tradition, alongside Albert the Great, Nicholas of Cusa, Möhler, Scheeben, and Guardini. Nor was he forgotten by leading Catholic theologians at the time of the second Vatican Council. As Karl Rahner put it in 1965, “One must not forget Father Erich Przywara. For the Catholics of Germany in the twenties, thirties, and forties he was considered one of the greatest minds. He had a great influence on all of us when we were young.”⁸ Fittingly, therefore, when Przywara was awarded an Upper-Silesian cultural prize in 1967, it was Rahner who gave the *laudatio*, in which, notwithstanding the eulogistic nature of the genre, he made a number of striking claims about the “old teacher,” among them: “I feel compelled to say that we, the next generation, as well as future generations still have critical things to learn from him.”⁹ Moreover, “The whole Przywara, especially the late Przywara, is yet to come. He stands at a place in the road that many in the Church have yet to get past.”¹⁰ All of which raises questions about what Rahner valued in Przywara – not to mention Balthasar’s lifelong respect for him as an “unforgettable guide and master” and the “greatest spirit” he was ever permitted to meet.¹¹

Needless to say, I cannot hope to answer such questions fully; nor can I hope to discuss Przywara’s important late work; nor can I fully address invidious claims that have been made recently about his and von Balthasar’s stance toward Judaism and National

⁷ Joseph Ratzinger, “Erich Przywaras Alterswerk,” in *Wort und Wahrheit* 13 (1958), 220f.

⁸ See Paul Imhof, ed., *Karl Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews 1965-1985* (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 14.

⁹ Karl Rahner, “Laudatio auf Erich Przywara,” in *Gnade als Freiheit. Kleine theologische Beiträge* (Freiburg: Herder, 1968), 271.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 272.

¹¹ See Hans Urs von Balthasar, *My Work: In Retrospect* (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1993), 50, 89: “[...] Erich Przywara, an unforgettable guide and master. Never since have I encountered such a combination of depth and fullness of analytic clarity and all-embracing synoptic vision. The publication of three volumes of his works in my house is intended as an external sign of thanks; but none of my own books should hide what it owes to him.”

Socialism.¹² My focus here is rather on Przywara's early thought and, specifically, his deployment of the concept of the *analogia entis* as a Catholic standard in response to the dialectical theology of the early Barth and the phenomenology of Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger. Before turning to Przywara's application of the *analogia entis*, however – and because of the misunderstandings to which it is prone – I begin necessarily with a brief account of it.

The analogia entis in nuce: its history, conciliar basis, and theological refinement via Augustine and Thomas into a fundamental principle of Catholic metaphysics and theology

The first thing to say about the *analogia entis* is that Przywara did not invent it; rather, according to Karl Barth, the Antichrist did. Now, whatever one makes of Barth's famous barb in the prologue to the *Church Dogmatics*, and whether or not it deserves to be understood as a case of hyperbole – or as a "friendly *sottise*," as Przywara rather magnanimously took it¹³ – it should certainly be understood as a similarly strident but in this case anti-Catholic instantiation of his famous "Nein!" to Emil Brunner. For in both cases, in order to establish *ex negativo* the methodology of his own dogmatics as a church dogmatics, Barth is saying that he rejects *all* theological prolegomena, whatever form they may take – whether it be Brunner's commitment as a Protestant to some form of natural theology or Przywara's commitment as a Catholic to some kind of metaphysics (or ontology). In other words, what Barth sees and fundamentally rejects in the *analogia entis* is the "presupposes" in the venerable Thomistic principle that "faith (grace) does not destroy but presupposes and perfects reason (nature)": *fides (gratia) non destruit, sed supponit et perficit rationem (naturam)*.¹⁴ And Barth rejects it because on his view this kind of

¹² See Paul Silas Peterson, "Erich Przywara on Sieg-Katholizismus, Bolshevism, the Jews, Volk, Reich and the *analogia entis* in the 1920s and 1930s," in *Journal for the History of Modern Theology* 19 (2012): 104-40; Paul Silas Peterson, *The Early Hans Urs von Balthasar: Historical Contexts and Intellectual Formation* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015). Given the sensational nature of Peterson's claims, however, one cannot avoid responding to them, however briefly, here. For starters, see Jonathan King's review in *Modern Theology* 33, no. 2 (April 2017): 308-11, which raises serious questions about Peterson's methodology and motivations. As King points out, in his zeal to prove that Balthasar was a racist, a fascist, and an anti-Semite, Peterson advances enough "blatant misrepresentations" and "suspicious omissions," and performs so many "sleights of hand," as to "call into question the trustworthiness of his entire effort" (311). Unfortunately, one must conclude the same about Peterson's effort to disparage Przywara on similar grounds. In the meantime Peterson has published yet another article on the topic, which only underscores the same methodological problems. See "A Third Time, Erich Przywara, the Jews and *Stimmen der Zeit*: With a Response to Aaron Pidel and a brief look into Przywara's late letters to Carl Schmitt," *Journal for the History of Modern Theology* 24 (2017): 202-39. In brief, instead of reading Przywara in context or in light of other works or over time, Peterson consistently reads selectively and adduces sound bites as evidence; instead of following Przywara's arguments to the end, where the Jesuit typically makes a discerning judgment, he routinely conflates Przywara's views with those of his interlocutors (sometimes even attributing things to Przywara that he nowhere says); and in general, instead of reading Przywara charitably, he always opts for the most negative possible interpretation of the relevant texts and historical facts, e.g., the Jesuit journal *Stimmen der Zeit* was not shut down by the Gestapo until 1941, ergo the Munich Jesuits, Przywara included, must have been promoting nationalistic, racist, and anti-Semitic views amenable to the regime. And in general, Peterson unfortunately downplays or outright disregards whatever evidence that would qualify or disqualify his own conclusions. For other critics of Peterson's reductive methodology, see Aaron Pidel, S. J., "'Erich Przywara and 'Catholic Fascism': A Response to Paul Silas Peterson," in *Journal for the History of Modern Theology* 23 (2016): 27-55; and Joachim Negel, "Nichts ist Wirklicher als Gott," 222f.

¹³ Erich Przywara, *In und Gegen: Stellungnahmen zur Zeit* (Nürnberg: Glock und Lutz, 1955), 278.

¹⁴ In 1932 it is clear that Przywara is committed to this principle; see *Analogia Entis*, 169f. But the relation between them was never, shall we say, an undynamic one. See Karl-Heinz Wiesemann, *Zerspringender Akkord*, 274-404.

methodology, which he associates with Catholicism as well as with liberal Protestantism, gives reason and what we think *we* can establish by reason priority – and so the upper hand – over revelation. For Barth, however, far from needing our prolegomena, much less our rules of engagement and interpretation, revelation shatters our conceptual idols, coming as it *actually* does in sublime disregard of all human *possibilities* in the power of the Holy Spirit, which does not wait for our assent, for any *fiat mihi*, but takes us up immediately into the event of revelation with its own criteria of understanding.¹⁵ This I take to be Barth's fundamental point, which makes him, on Przywara's view, a genuine heir of the Reformers.¹⁶ Equally, I take this to be the fundamental conclusion of Keith Johnson's important study of this topic.¹⁷ For, if *this* is what Barth was against – the Thomistic understanding of an analogous relationship between reason and faith, nature and grace – then Barth *did* understand the *analogia entis*, or at least its basic pre-suppositions, and his rejection of it would therefore (if one accepts the terms of his theology) appear to be justified.

But notwithstanding these important clarifications, which underscore the deep confessional differences informing this historical debate, the question of understanding or misunderstanding on the part of Barth (and those of his disciples who have repeated his anathema) is not so easily resolved.¹⁸ For even if we bracket the primary confessional issue of whether the *analogia entis* is a philosophical principle commended by reason and as such a basis for natural theology, and even if it is bound up at some level with the Thomistic understanding of nature and grace, its most basic meaning – that God is *in* creation but also and precisely *beyond* creation – is *also* something commended by Scripture (much in the way that the doctrine of the Trinity is commended but nowhere explicitly stated). Furthermore, as Przywara tirelessly repeated, it is a principle that was dogmatically confirmed by the IV Lateran Council.¹⁹ In other words, whether or not the *analogia entis* is a matter of reason (as Przywara took it to be in the spirit of Vatican I), it is for Catholics *also* – at least as far as this more basic sense is concerned – a matter of *faith*. Indeed, as I will explain presently, it is a principle that applies not just to a natural God-world relation (whatever we take “natural” to mean in a fallen world), but even to the most exalted regions of supernatural participation *by grace* in the divine life. In attacking the *analogia entis* tout court, therefore, Barth was not just attacking a philosophical principle; he was willy-nilly attacking much of what all Christians hold in common: namely,

¹⁵ In other words, according to this kind of theology, revelation is already rapture; just as for Luther faith is already righteousness; or, to put it even more simply, for Barth our knowledge of God, like Calvin's understanding of election, is unconditional.

¹⁶ See Erich Przywara, “Gott in uns und über uns,” in *Ringens der Gegenwart*, vol. 2 (Augsburg: Benno Filser Verlag, 1929), 553.

¹⁷ See Keith Johnson, *Karl Barth and the Analogia Entis* (London: T&T Clark, 2010).

¹⁸ George Hunsinger's *Reading Barth with Charity: A Hermeneutical Proposal* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015) is a case in point. See, for instance, the book's remarkably brief appendix on the “Analogia Entis in Balthasar and Barth,” which perpetuates the myth that for Balthasar (and, presumably, for Przywara as well), God is a kind of “being” related to creatures by a “common scale.”

¹⁹ See Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 43-6; Denzinger 803-08.

the principle that God is “ever greater” (*semper maior*), and that it is therefore right and just that we should ever humble ourselves like chicks beneath his wings (Ps. 61:4).²⁰

Nevertheless, Barth was right that Przywara did not invent the *analogia entis* and that it has long been part of the Catholic tradition. Not only is it found in Augustine, specifically in Book XV of *De Trinitate*, which appears to have been the basis for the decision of the IV Lateran Council.²¹ It is also the implicit (but obvious) teaching of Aquinas,²² whom Przywara calls the teacher of the *analogia entis*, especially on account of Thomas’s teaching on secondary causes (since this teaching underscores, more so than Neo-Platonic models of exemplarism, including Augustine’s, the difference between God and creation). It is also, for that matter, the implicit teaching of Gregory of Nyssa, as is evident from Gregory’s reading of Exodus 3:14 and his corresponding understanding of the relation between Being and non-being. But it remained for centuries more of an implicit than an explicit teaching and thus stood in need of theological explication (precisely in keeping with Newman’s understanding of the development of doctrine, but here in terms of the Church’s understanding of creation). In fact, it does not appear as a *terminus technicus* until Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, and only thereafter, by way of Suárez’s *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, made its way into the Jesuit manuals in which Przywara first encountered it.²³

But, as Rahner pointed out, for Przywara the *analogia entis* is not just a scholastic technicality; nor, one might add, is his understanding of it to be identified exclusively with the teaching of Cajetan or Suárez (since he is genuinely appreciative of the insights of the Dominican and the Jesuit, and, as is typical of his Catholic sensibility, attempts to

²⁰In the words of Augustine, from whom this phrase derives, and which bear repeating since they reveal the spiritual import of Przywara’s understanding of the *analogia entis*: Augustine, *Ennarrationes in Ps. 62* (61), 16: “Parvuli sumus: ergo protegat nos Deus sub umbraculo alarum suarum. Quid cum maiores facti fuerimus? Bonum est nobis ut et tunc progegat nos, ut sub illo maiore semper nos pulli simus. Semper enim ille maior est, quantumcumque crevimus. Nemo dicat: Protegat me, cum parvulus sum: quasi aliquando ad tantam magnitudinem possit pervenire, quae sibi sufficiat. Sine protectione Dei nihil es. Semper ab illo protegi velimus: tunc semper in illo magni esse poterimus, si semper sub illo parvuli simus.” [“We are little ones: may God therefore protect us under the shadow of his wings. What if we are made greater? Even then it is good for us that he should protect us, that we might be little chicks beneath him who is ever greater. For however much we attain, he is ever greater. Let no one say: May he protect me when I am little: as if we could ever arrive at a stature that would be so great as to be self-sufficient. Without God’s protection you are nothing. We [should] always want to be protected by him: then we will always be able to be great in him, if we are always little ones beneath him.”]

²¹*De Trin.*, XV, 39: “Verum ne hanc imaginem ab eadem Trinitate factam, et suo vitio in deterius commutatam, ita eidem comparet Trinitati, ut omni modo existimet similem; sed potius in qualicumque ista similitudine magnam quoque dissimilitudinem cernat, quantum esse satis videbatur, admonui.” In Hill’s translation: “This image, made by the Trinity and altered for the worse by its own fault, is not so to be compared to that Trinity that it is reckoned similar to it in every respect. Rather [one] should note how great the dissimilarity is in whatever similarity there may be.”

²²For the *analogia entis* in Aquinas one need look no further than *Summa Th.* I, q. 4, a. 3, corp.: “In this way all things, insofar as they are beings, are like God [*a Deo assimilantur*] as the first and universal principle of all being”; and *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 5 ad 7: “Just as all things participate in the goodness of God – not numerically the same [goodness], but by likeness (*similitudinem*) – so they participate, by likeness, in the *esse* of God.” See also Aquinas, *Scriptum super sententiis* I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 3 sed contra 1; II, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1 c. My thanks to Richard Cross for the latter references, and for his work on participation in Thomas and Scotus, among others.

²³See, for example, Suárez, *Disputationes* 28, §3 and 32, §2. See also John P. Doyle, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being,” in *The Modern Schoolman* 46 (March 1969): 219–49; (May 1969): 323–41. For a general history of the concept, see Julio Terán-Dutari, “Die Geschichte des Terminus ‘Analogia Entis’ und das Werk Erich Przywaras,” in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft* 77 (1970): 164–5.

synthesize them).²⁴ Nor does analogy function in theology merely to regulate theological language – guarding, on the one hand, against the presumption of univocity (of thinking that our words mean the same thing when predicated of God and creatures), and, on the other, against the false humility that is indistinguishable from agnosticism and presumes that one cannot speak meaningfully of God at all.²⁵ Rather, for Przywara the *analogia entis* has a comprehensive theological significance, concerning the very nature of reality, the relation between the finite and the infinite, and the ontological similarity-in-ultimate-dissimilarity between God and world. In others words, it bears at the end of the day on everything.²⁶

Take, for example, the most central Christian doctrine of the incarnation. If the world is univocally identified with God, there could be on God's part no real advent, no real coming into the world: the being of God and the being of the world would be indistinguishable. On the other hand, if the world is equivocally different from God, then Christ could (metaphysically speaking) not have come unto "his own," but would have been entering into a reality not simply fallen, but fundamentally alien to himself as the Logos "by whom all things were made" (John 1:3). (It is therefore crucial in Catholic-Reformed debate about the *analogia entis* that one distinguish between *metaphysical* and *existential* alienation: Catholics, too, affirm the latter, which is precisely why creation stands in need of redemption through Christ, but not the former, since this would be tantamount to saying that God is no longer the Creator, and thus to embrace a form of Gnosticism.) At the end of the day, therefore, the *analogia entis* turns out to be indispensable to Christian doctrine on multiple levels – from the doctrine of creation to the doctrine of the incarnation to the doctrine of sanctification. Indeed, it so important that Przywara could speak of it as "Catholicism's metaphysical *a priori*."²⁷ At the same time, he believed that it was crucial to Catholicism's engagement with the modern world, which in its secular and religious forms, in the absence of any analogical metaphysics, tends to reel drunkenly between the extremes of a world-denying Gnosticism and a God-denying secularism. Before we turn to the question of *how* Przywara deploys the *analogia entis* in the 1920s, however, let us explain more precisely *what* he understood by this term, firstly, in light of the IV Lateran Council, and then in light of Augustine and Aquinas.

In 1215 the IV Lateran Council was dealing with, among other things, the implications of Joachim of Fiore's Trinitarian theology. Against Peter Lombard, Joachim had argued that the unity of God resides not in the divine nature, but in the unity of the persons of the Trinity, and that this unity was like that of "many men who are called one people, and many faithful, who are called one Church."²⁸ The holy abbot also appealed to many scriptures, including Christ's high-priestly prayer "that they may be

²⁴ Cf. Stephen A. Long's *Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), whose account is close to Przywara's own, but less rhythmic and more decidedly Cajetanian.

²⁵ Such is the conclusion of a number of commentators who restrict their considerations largely to *ST I*, Q. 13. See, for example, Herbert McCabe's commentary in *Summa Theologiae*, vol. 3: Knowing and Naming God (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964), 106: "Analogy is not a way of getting to know about God, nor is it a theory of the structure of the universe, it is a comment on our use of certain words." For further discussion of this view, see the introduction to *Analogia Entis*, 40-3.

²⁶ In the words of Rahner, Przywara transformed the *analogia entis* "from a scholastic technicality into the fundamental structure of Catholic theology" (Rahner, "Laudatio auf Erich Przywara," 270).

²⁷ Przywara, *Ringens der Gegenwart*, vol. 2, 663.

²⁸ Denzinger, 803.

one, just as we are one" (John 17:22). In its decision, however, the Council sided not with Joachim, whose holiness it recognized, but with Peter Lombard, finding that Joachim failed to distinguish properly between the "union of identity in nature" and "the unity of charity in grace," and thus threatened to collapse the insuperable difference between God and creation – not to mention the threat of collapsing the immanent Trinity into the three ages of the world. In the final words of the council fathers: "*Inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos non maior sit dissimilitudo notanda*" ["One cannot note any similarity between creator and creature, however great, without being compelled to observe an ever *greater* dissimilarity between them"].²⁹ Such is the dogmatic basis of the *analogia entis*. And it is such a simple point, Przywara contended, that essentially any child could understand it, because it comes down to affirming that God is *semper maior* – and remains ever greater – *beyond* every creaturely likeness, however great.

But if the *analogia entis* belongs to the implicit reasoning of a child, it can also be formulated with varying degrees of philosophical and theological sophistication; and this is what we find in Przywara, who refines the concept to such a dizzying degree of complexity that it becomes in its final form a formal principle of everything ("*forma sola universalis*"), comprising within its span not just all the tensions in the history of philosophy between, say, Heraclitus and Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle, Hegel and Kierkegaard, Husserl and Heidegger, et al., but every *possible* metaphysics within a final, inscrutable analogy between *two* analogies: between a more idealist Platonic-Augustinian analogy of "transcending immanence" and a more realist Aristotelian-Thomistic analogy of "indwelling transcendence."³⁰ Needless to say, such abstruse formulations go a long way toward explaining why at some point Przywara became, even for those philosophically inclined, simply too difficult to follow.³¹ In what follows, therefore, absent a full commentary, I will restrict myself to showing in what ways Augustine and Thomas are enfolded into Przywara's understanding of the *analogia entis*, beginning with an article published in 1923 in *Stimmen der Zeit*, entitled "Gott in uns und Gott über uns."³²

In the opening of this article Przywara suggests that differences between the confessions, that is, between Protestantism and Catholicism, call for a decision, an *Entscheidung*, in the sense of Gogarten.³³ But Przywara does not think that premature attempts at ecumenism, of the kind he associates with Friedrich Heiler's "evangelical Catholicism," are helpful in this regard.³⁴ Rather, he suggests that a proper decision can be made, and the cause of peace is served, only when each confession reflects upon what is ultimate, namely, its concept of God – its *Gottesbegriff* – because it is here, he thinks, that the real differences emerge. Consequently, this is where the *analogia entis* comes into play. As Przywara puts it, "'The sign of contradiction' in this earnest debate, the sign which

²⁹ Denzinger, 806.

³⁰ See Przywara's late essay, "Metaphysics, Religion, Analogy," in *Analogia Entis*, 411f.

³¹ As von Balthasar noted with regard to the *Analogia Entis*, each page of this text really requires another ten pages of commentary. See Balthasar, "Die Metaphysik Erich Przywaras," *Schweizerische Rundschau* 33 (1933): 489.

³² See Przywara, *Ringens der Gegenwart*, II, 543–78.

³³ Notably, Przywara takes the dialectical theologians, Barth, Thurneysen, and Gogarten, rather than the fathers of liberal Protestantism, Schleiermacher and Ritschl, or their heirs Harnack, Wobbermin, et al., to be his chief interlocutors. The reason for this is that he considers Barth et al. to represent a "genuine rebirth" of Protestantism in the spirit of Luther. See Przywara, *Ringens der Gegenwart*, II, 552f.

³⁴ Przywara, *Ringens der Gegenwart*, II, 543.

reveals the differences and bears the potential of healing them, is the God of the *analogia entis*, the God who is above us *and* in us.³⁵

On the face of it, it could seem odd indeed that Przywara makes the differences between the confessions turn on what, at the end of the day, is a matter of metaphysics. But following the interpretations of Troeltsch and Franz Kiefl, Przywara thinks that everything really does turn on it – and on the difference, specifically, between the *analogia entis* and the Lutheran doctrine of God's exclusive agency, *Alleinwirksamkeit*. For whereas the *analogia entis* makes room for creatures to participate in salvation, once it is given, the Lutheran doctrine, strictly understood, could be taken to deny creaturely forms of mediation, including the necessity of such creaturely institutions as the Church and its sacraments. For Przywara, in other words, the *analogia entis* entails more than a general ontological similarity-within-ultimate-difference between God and creatures, as stipulated by IV Lateran; it *also* entails a similarity-within-ultimate-difference between Divine and human *causality*, which the Lutheran doctrine, strictly understood, collapses. And for Przywara this is precisely why Aquinas's doctrine of secondary causality is such an important ingredient in the basic concept of the analogy of being, helping the Church to face the challenges posed not only by Luther, but also by all the philosophical systems stemming from him, however ironic their patrimony may be: from Spinoza to Hegel to that son of a Lutheran pastor and self-proclaimed anti-Christ, Nietzsche. For, simply put, whereas the Lutheran Hegel reduces human causality to an illusion, Nietzsche turns the tables by turning God into a fiction. In short, the one fictionalizes and erases the other.

But as Przywara keenly notes, the very positions that seem so antithetical are at the end of the day simply two faces of the same logic of identity, separated only by a thin line of perspective, subject like an Escher drawing to sudden reversals — with the caveat that these reversals, which follow from the rejection of the *analogia entis*, come with frightful historical consequences. As Przywara strikingly puts it in the provocative final pages of *Ringens der Gegenwart* in 1929:

As for this unity as identity [*Identität-Eins*] of God and world, which took the place of polarity and its unity-in-tension [*Polaritäts-Spannung-Eins*] of God and world, what does it really matter whether one call it God or world, whether one call it the world-denying theopanism of Spinoza or the God-denying pantheism of Schopenhauer-Nietzsche? In either case the inevitable consequence was the frightful reeling of modernity between a sensual, pleasure-seeking intoxication with the world and a fanatical, eschatological hatred of the world: is not this the deadly fever that is shaking Europe even now?³⁶

From this perspective we can now see why Przywara held up Augustine as the Catholic antidote to modern dialectics. For, according to Przywara, the North African church father shows that what is metaphysically ultimate is neither an absolute immanence nor an absolute transcendence, but a dynamic rhythm between them — between the poles, so to speak, of divine immanence and divine transcendence. As Przywara puts it, "The great idea of Augustine, which constitutes the, so to speak, formal principle of his thought, and bears implications even for the subtlest branches of Christian ethics is this: *Deus interior et*

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Przywara, *Ringens der Gegenwart*, II, 960f.

exterior, God in all and above all, God more inward than we are to ourselves, and yet transcending and surpassing us as the one who is infinite and incomprehensible.³⁷ The point, for Przywara, is as simple as it is fundamental — not just theoretically but also practically. And so he goes on to say,

And because He declares himself to be a God of blessed mystical intimacy as well as being, simultaneously, a God of the coolest distance, the fundamental disposition of the soul that believes in God is one of "fearing love and loving fear" — a fear that springs from love in that love fears to lose the beloved, and a love that by means of fear maintains itself in a state of holy sobriety and tender reverence. The element of love corresponds to "God in me"; the element of fear, to "God above me." Both, however, are bound together so that the immanence of "God in me" does not make God into man, and so that the transcendence of "God above me" does not ultimately make man into God.³⁸

Conversely, therefore, the problem with modernity, beginning with the Reformation, is that it has been unable to maintain the two in productive tension — in terms of what he calls a *Spannungseinheit*. Either it absorbs immanence into transcendence, and all creaturely objectivity and mediation into divine subjectivity, in which case we have "theopanism"; or it collapses transcendence into immanence, divinity into humanity, in which case we have pantheism in one form or another. Whereas the former makes nothing of becoming, which is reduced to the manifestation of either a divine will (Luther) or a divine logic (Hegel), the latter makes nothing of being and reduces the question of being to the question of finitude — which is why, for Przywara, the early Heidegger is precisely a pantheist, as erroneous as this designation might *prima facie* seem.³⁹ In both cases, however, Przywara avers, the concept of God is dissolved — whether it be in the name of divine immanence and a religion of feeling (à la Schleiermacher) or in the name of a dogmatic theology of divine transcendence (à la

³⁷ Ibid., II, 543.

³⁸ Ibid., 543f. The conjunction of divine intimacy and divine transcendence is stated, perhaps most famously, in *Confessions* III, 6 (11): *tu autem interior intimo meo et superior summo meo*. For the ethical implications, however, see *Enn. in Ps. 118, 22* (6): *Tu interior intimis meis, tu intus in corde legem posuisti mihi spiritu tuo, tamquam digito tuo; ut eam non tamquam servus sine amore metuerem, sed casto timore ut filius diligerem, et dilectione casta timerem*. ["You who are more inward than my most inward parts, you have put your law in me, in my heart's depths, by your spirit, as by your finger, so that I might not walk fearing you like a slave, without love, but as a son, loving you with pure reverence and revering you with a pure love."] See also Przywara, *Ringeln der Gegenwart*, 577: "Catholic religiosity is and remains an ineffable polarity between 'God in us' and 'God above us' and therefore of 'law and life,' and therefore of 'life and fear' and of 'joy and moral struggle,' and whoever absolutizes one or the other of these poles can in the end no longer contribute to salvation, even if his exaggerations shed new light on an idea that has received less attention."

³⁹ Nor is Przywara's view of Heidegger significantly altered by the latter's so-called turn to Being, since for Heidegger Being is never anything more than the Being of beings, apart from which it is precisely *Nichts*. Thus, even when Heidegger shifts into the apocalyptic register of Being's self-revealing, this cannot be said to constitute a breakthrough to a genuine transcendence. Admittedly, from an apophatic, Eckhartian perspective, it might be legitimate to speak of God as "no-thing," but this is not what Heidegger means, since theology is subaltern to ontology, understood as a strictly philosophical discipline. Indeed, if God is allowed to appear in Heidegger's philosophy, a possibility he seems to admit in his 1966 *Spiegel* interview, then it is not as Being itself on the order of Aquinas' *ipsum esse subsistens*, but only as a mythopoetic "entity" and in any event as something ontic ("das" Gott, "ein" Gott, which is rightly translated as "the god" or "a god") on the horizon of Being.

Barth).⁴⁰ Indeed, he suggests that both extremes are, at the end of the day, equally remote from a true understanding of God, and that the one leads as much to the denial of God as the other. Thus Przywara contends that Augustine remains for all posterity "the thinker of the Christian balance," which is to say, the first great thinker of the *analogia entis*, since one finds in him both the God of blessed intimacy (divine immanence) and the God who, "if you comprehend him, is not God" (divine transcendence).⁴¹

For Przywara, then, the *analogia entis* means (1) according to IV Lateran a relationship between divine being and creaturely being in which God is "ever greater" (*semper maior*), and (2), following Augustine, a relationship between divine immanence and divine transcendence. Importantly, however, the relationship between immanence and transcendence is not static, but dynamic, which requires that it be read in light of the emphasis of IV Lateran on the "greater dissimilarity" (*maior dissimilitudo*) within every *similitudo*, however great (*tanta similitudo*). But we have still by no means sorted out all that, for Przywara, the *analogia entis* implies. For that we would need to discuss at the very least two more things: firstly, the tremendous import of what Przywara calls the Aristotelian analogy as we find it in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (1016b), where Aristotle uses the word analogy to describe "a relation of one thing to another," specifically, a relation of one proportion to another (ὅς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο); and, secondly, the Thomistic "real distinction" between essence and existence in creatures as it relates to a real identity of essence and existence in God. In the words of Aquinas, *sua igitur essentia est suum esse*.⁴² Only then can we begin to appreciate all that Przywara means by the term, *analogia entis*, since it refers not just to the God-world relation (the transcendent analogy of being), but also to the analogical nature of creaturely being, in its own right, the immanent analogy, or the immanent aspect, of the analogy of being.

Needless to say, this complicates matters considerably, and in Przywara's *Analogia Entis* it gets even more complicated. It is therefore crucial to bear in mind that the full form of the *analogia entis* is an intersection of two different analogies – an immanent ("horizontal") analogy and a transcendent ("vertical") analogy – and, as such, has a cross-like structure.⁴³ So let us begin with the immanent analogy of the *analogia entis*, which, building on Aristotle and Thomas, Przywara understands as a dynamic unity of essence and existence, each of which is related to the other, but irreducible to the other – just as, in anthropological terms, the human being is an irreducible relation between man and woman, or, for that matter, between soul and body. In both cases we can loosely speak of an immanent "analogy" inasmuch as the formal structure is one of *alio pro alio*. In and of themselves, however, these "analogies" have no explanation. Rather, for Przywara they show precisely that the creature qua creature is itself

⁴⁰ As he strikingly puts it years later, "All that is left [once the *analogia entis* is denied] is an either-or between a piety toward God that is hostile to the world and a piety toward the world that is hostile toward God. Such is the either-or between the Reformation taken to its logical conclusion (as in the early Barth) and secularism taken to its logical conclusion (as with Lenin and Stalin)." See Przywara, *Logos* (Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1964), 112.

⁴¹ "Si comprehendis non est Deus." See Augustine, Sermon 117, 5; cf. Sermon 52, 16: "Quid ergo dicamus, fratres, de Deo? Si enim quod vis dicere, si cepisti, non est Deus: si comprehendere potuisti, aliud pro Deo comprehendisti. Si quasi comprehendere potuisti, cogitatione tua te decepisti. Hoc ergo non est, si comprehendisti: si autem hoc est, non comprehendisti. Quid ergo vis loqui, quod comprehendere non potuisti?"

⁴² S. T. I, q. 3, a. 3, corp.; Przywara, *Ringens der Gegenwart*, vol. 2, 945.

⁴³ See Bernhard Gertz, "Kreuz-Struktur: Zur theologischen Methode Erich Przywaras," *Theologie und Philosophie* 45 (1970): 555-61; idem, *Glaubenswelt als Analogie. Die theologische Analogielehre Erich Przywaras und ihr Ort in der Auseinandersetzung um die analogia fidei* (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1969).

mysteriously incomprehensible, indeed, a kind of abyss that is incapable of any final self-definition. For *what* the creature is, its essence, can never explain its existence – just as the most thoroughgoing scientific account of the universe cannot answer the fundamental philosophical question, which was well-known to the scholastics and reformulated by Leibniz, as to why there is something (anything or any law) rather than nothing. Indeed, following Przywara, the mystery of the real distinction is precisely why philosophy has never been able to get to the bottom of its own historical undulations between materialism and idealism, essentialism and existentialism, and so forth. But what is incapable of self-definition is not *eo ipso* without meaning or explanation in something beyond it. Rather, in itself creaturely being – in its parts and taken as a whole – is essentially a sign that points beyond itself, being constitutively an analogy of what alone can fulfill it. And it is precisely here, therefore, that the “transcendent” aspect of the analogy of being comes into play. For inasmuch as God (in Christ) enters into the abyss of creaturely being, the immanent analogy is redeemed as an analogy of the God who is mysteriously in-and-beyond it – the God in whom essence and existence, the ideal and the real, indeed, even being and becoming (inasmuch as the immanent Trinity is an eternal *movement* of love) are one. In view of this brief sketch of what Przywara means by the *analogia entis*, let us now turn to how he deploys it, first, vis-à-vis the dialectical theology of the 1920s.

Przywara's Engagement with Dialectical Theology

On September 30, 1923, Eduard Thurneysen wrote to Barth, saying “Procure a copy of the August issue of *Stimmen der Zeit*. In it there is an unusually perceptive and thorough essay about us by an interlocutor from the Catholic side. It is interesting because it makes the Catholic standpoint very clear. In addition you will find some substantial and in-depth observations about Augustine. The author is an expert. We come off well, even if our deepest concern was not seen...”⁴⁴ Whatever Thurneysen may have meant by his and Barth’s “deepest concern,” what is important here, historically speaking, is that this marks the beginning of their reckoning via Przywara with Catholic theology, and of Przywara’s reckoning with them. And, as far as Przywara’s assessment goes, they must have been flattered, because Przywara considered them, and not the liberal Protestantism of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Harnack, et al., to be the genuine heirs of the Reformation. As Przywara puts it, “In declaring war against all subjective religion [...], the movement [of dialectical theology] represents a genuine rebirth of Protestantism. It is surely fitting, therefore, that the three friends [i.e., Barth, Thurneysen, and Gogarten] regularly include selections from Luther in their new journal *Zwischen den Zeiten*. Of all contemporary Protestant groups, they [more than any other] can claim Luther as their father.”⁴⁵

But, of course, as a Catholic theologian, Przywara also had his reservations. For inasmuch as dialectical theology abjures any natural relation between God and creation – to the point that the only relation between them is that of the absolute “no” – it directly conflicts with the Catholic concept of God that we have just summarized in terms of the *analogia entis*. In short, Przywara says, the formal relation between God and creation is not analogy but “negation”:

⁴⁴ See Karl Barth *Gesamtausgabe, Briefwechsel Barth-Thurneysen*, vol. 2 (1921-1930), 190; see also 638, 651-4.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Whereas the *analogia entis* proper to the Catholic concept of God entails a mysterious tension between similar and dissimilar, corresponding to the tension between God in us and God beyond us, in the Protestant concept of God the “similarity” is entirely done away with. God is absolutely and completely “Other,” as Otto puts it, or, in the formulation of Barth-Gogarten-Thurneysen, the “No” – the No of a God who alone is real [*alleinwirklich*] and alone is efficacious [*alleinwirksam*].⁴⁶

In other words, what is at issue here from Przywara’s Catholic perspective is once again the *allein* in the Lutheran doctrine of God’s *Alleinwirksamkeit*, i.e., the same problematic *sola* – in this case the *sola* with regard to *gratia* – that defined the Reformation. To be sure, as Przywara himself points out, one can find anticipations of Luther in late medieval nominalism and German mysticism, inasmuch as the former emphasizes God’s absolute power (*Dei potentia absoluta*) and the latter the nothingness of the creature’s ground to which, spiritually speaking, it should actively return in order passively to be reborn in God (as for Eckhart, Tauler, and the author of the *Theologia Germanica*). But it remained for Luther to combine these separate emphases and to formulate as a matter of doctrine – and no longer simply as a matter of theological debate or salutary spiritual discipline – that God *alone* is at work in the salvation of human beings *to the exclusion* of any human *cooperation*. As Przywara observes, following Troeltsch, the target of Luther’s polemic is “the effective power of reason...to which he sharply opposes in the most radical terms the idea of a pure and unconditional theonomy”; as a result, reason, moral excellence, and human spontaneity are nothing but expressions of the solely effective power and agency of God.⁴⁷ In other words, as Przywara sees it, for Luther and the dialectical theologians, God does not work as a primary cause with and within creatures as genuine secondary causes, but instead acts immediately and without them. The result, he thinks, is the following:

One side of [the formula] “God in us and above us,” namely, “God in us,” is devalued. The result is a completely different concept of God: God, understood as “God above us,” becomes, as it were, the essence of the creature: the creature is reduced to an essence-less apparition of the “God above us,” who alone is real and efficacious. Transcendence and immanence are no longer bound together in a tension of opposites, but have become identical. To the extent that the hidden, incomprehensible God, the *Deus absconditus*, ... is not just “all in all,” but “everything alone,” God becomes the essence of the creature, and all creaturely agency, inasmuch as it is “essential,” is His agency alone.⁴⁸

Whatever historical accidents may have precipitated Luther’s break with the Catholic Church, as far as Przywara is concerned Luther’s break and many important aspects of his theology – from his ecclesiology to his understanding of works – directly follow from this one notion of *Alleinwirksamkeit*: “It is clear why Luther denies any representation of God in human beings, i.e., in the Church according to its fundamental principle. For God is only ‘God above us’ and is therefore essentially unrepresentable.”⁴⁹ Equally,

⁴⁶ Przywara, *Ringens der Gegenwart* II, 554.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 550.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 549.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 551.

it is clear “why no ‘works’ can have any religious significance. For there is only *one* divine work, the work of God himself, the work of ‘God above us.’”⁵⁰ Finally, it is clear why justification must occur *sola fide*, understood in a strictly passive sense (*iustitia passiva*) to the exclusion of any genuine act of cooperation on the part of the believer: “As a subjective act it is no laying hold of, but only an absolutely passive ‘being taken hold of’ [Ergriffenwerden], and only subsequently a laying hold of the cover of the righteousness [Heiligkeit] of Christ.”⁵¹

But Przywara’s concern with Luther at this early juncture (he engages the Reformer in later years very appreciatively for having renewed the patristic teaching on the *admirabile commercium*) is not just that the Reformer is the legitimate “father” of dialectical theology, but that Luther initiated a historical dialectic of which dialectical theology is simply a manifestation. As Przywara strikingly puts it, Luther represents “the decisive break with the past and the seed of all that is to come.”⁵² In the previous section I indicated what Przywara means by this, but now we can be more precise. He means that, in a first stage of modern dialectics, the Lutheran doctrine of God’s *Alleinwirksamkeit* – that “God alone is everything and the human being nothing, indeed, nothing but the ‘sin’ that inheres in the being of the creature qua creature” – paved the way for “strictly pantheistic systems” from Spinoza to Hegel (notwithstanding the fact that Hegel’s philosophy was not possible until the “granite” of Luther’s doctrine of sin had been dissolved).⁵³ In other words, in this first stage initiated by Luther, Przywara sees a gradual theopanistic reduction of the creature to (nothing but) a manifestation of the divine, which alone is real and alone is the real agent of history. But then, in a second stage, Przywara sees a dynamic reversal of this linear movement, and a tragic dialectical shift (absent any *analogia entis*) from a one-sided transcendence to a one-sided immanence, in short, from Luther to Nietzsche:

Then this more linear [*positiv*] development [viz., from Luther to Spinoza to Hegel] gives way to a second that amounts to its actual reversal. For, as we have already said, the Lutheran doctrine of God is, so to speak, loaded with explosives. The human spirit refuses to be violated [vergewaltigen] by a one-sided transcendence; immanence can be abolished only at the cost of its violent return, but it is a return now no longer, as it was before, in the form of a dynamic unity [*Spannungseinheit*] with transcendence, but rather in the form of a radical overturning [*Umschlag*] of transcendence. Instead of the Catholic unity-in-tension between transcendence and immanence, we have, beginning with Luther, a transcendence that converts into immanence, only to convert once again into transcendence. At one point man is disenfranchised and everything is about God and God alone; at another, God is disenfranchised and everything is about man and man alone. In this sense Nietzsche is the most obvious consequence of Luther: for his *Übermensch* is nothing other than man as God.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Ibid., 551.

⁵¹ Ibid., 551.

⁵² Ibid., 548. See 549.

⁵³ Ibid., 555. *Nota bene*, though Spinoza is a confusing case, for Przywara he is technically a theopanist (since the world is a manifestation of the divine substance, which alone is real).

⁵⁴ Ibid., 555f.

From Przywara's perspective, then, rather than being part of the solution, dialectical theology is ironically part of the problem; it is the victim of its own game. In rejecting the sobriety of the *analogia entis*, which preserves a similarity within ultimate dissimilarity to God, and which affirms human agency within a sovereign divine agency that graciously makes room for it, dialectical theology only furthers and exacerbates the dialectics that have been the bane of modernity since the Reformation – and the bane, too, Przywara contends, of Protestant theology itself, which oscillates back and forth between liberal Protestant and neo-Orthodox theologies, between theologies that begin with the subjective datum of faith, and theologies that begin with the objective word of God, between *Glaubenstheologie* and *Gottestheologie*, between, that is, Schleiermacher and Barth.⁵⁵

Przywara's Engagement with Phenomenology: Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger

Around the same time that Przywara was deploying the *analogia entis* against dialectical theology, he was also deploying it on the phenomenological front in his first scholarly monograph, *Religionsbegründung: Max Scheler – J. H. Newman*, which was published in 1923.⁵⁶ As the title would suggest, the work is concerned with the question of religion's foundation and, more particularly, the question of whether such a foundation is better provided by phenomenology than by psychology or transcendental philosophy or metaphysics. *Religionsbegründung* is by all accounts an ambitious first work: not only does Przywara provide a thoroughgoing analysis of Scheler's phenomenology up to that point, from Scheler's material ethics of value (1913-16) to his *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* (1921) to his *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1923), he also seeks to bring phenomenology back into conversation with metaphysics by means of Newman, and, in particular by means of Newman's distinction between implicit and explicit reasoning. While it is impossible to give a full accounting of this rich work, we can at least indicate what Przywara valued in Scheler and in what respects he considered his philosophy deficient.

On the positive side, what Przywara values in Scheler and what he values in phenomenology in general is its breaking free from the prison, so to speak, of Kant's transcendental philosophy, and its return "to the things themselves" – not as they are made to appear according to the categories of a transcendental subject, but as they freely appear in their givenness. Accordingly, he takes phenomenology to represent, at least in its initial phase, a dramatic reversal of Kant's Copernican revolution, allowing for the first time a genuine dialogue to take place between modern and scholastic philosophy after centuries of anti-scholastic prejudice, i.e., since Descartes. And he credits Scheler in particular for having taken phenomenology in this direction. For whereas Husserl, subsequent to his revolutionary period marked by the *Logical Investigations*, moves back in the direction of transcendental idealism, for Scheler "the 'openness to the given' leads logically in the direction of realism."⁵⁷ By the same token, Przywara values Scheler for breaking the spell of subjectivism in the philosophy of religion and confronting modern psychological theories of religion's origin: "Today's philosophy of religion is in the

⁵⁵ Przywara, "Neue Theologie?" in *Ringens der Gegenwart* II, 669.

⁵⁶ Erich Przywara, *Religionsbegründung: Max Scheler – J. H. Newman* (Freiburg: Herder, 1923).

⁵⁷ Przywara, *Religionsbegründung*, vii.

process of completely renouncing not only every explanation of religion in terms of 'desire' [*Bedürfnis*] or as a 'postulate' [of practical reason], but also Schleiermacher's 'feeling of dependence.'⁵⁸ In short, he values Scheler for his unconditional commitment to the objective validity and underivability of ethical and religious principles: "In their essence, morality and religion are dependent neither upon the individual ego [*Ich*], nor on universal human drives and instincts; they are neither the greatest expression of subjective life and experience (Simmel), nor functions of wholistic biological or cultural relations (Spencer, Wundt)."⁵⁹

It would be difficult to exaggerate the hope that Catholics of this time had in Scheler, who for all the above reasons was widely seen as a "beacon" of Catholic renewal.⁶⁰ But from Przywara's more or less Thomistic perspective, Scheler's gift was not unqualified. On the downside, Scheler not only denied any foundational role to teleology in morality; he also separated the question of being (*esse*) from the question of value (*bonum*), denied the scholastic understanding of the convertibility of the transcendentals, prioritized value over being, and, consequently, rejected metaphysics as a proper foundation for religion.⁶¹ Additionally, inasmuch as his phenomenological method aims directly at essences, it forgoes their discovery through and by abstraction from the senses, and so cannot easily be squared with the Thomistic epistemology whereby essences are known *per sensibilia*. There was, therefore, from Przywara's perspective, plenty to be concerned about, but perhaps nothing so much as Scheler's positing of an immediate relation between the act and the object of knowledge. The problem was not, of course, that Scheler understood God objectively. On the contrary, this is what made his phenomenology so attractive as part of a larger movement that Przywara frequently refers to as a "turn to the object" (which includes not only Scheler, but even such otherwise disparate standpoints as those of Barth and Rudolf Otto).⁶² Rather, the problem, and from Przywara's perspective the problem besetting phenomenology in general, was the supposed *immediacy* of this relation – whether to God or to other essences – even if one stipulates with Scheler that this immediate knowledge is given in love, which, as the essence of God, is the root of all essential knowledge.⁶³

And so, for Przywara, precisely at the point where Scheler seems so attractive (with his objectivity of values and the primacy of love), we come back willy-nilly to the *analogia entis*, for which, as we have seen, the immediacy of love cannot be separated from the distance of reverence.⁶⁴ (In the preface to *Analogia Entis*, incidentally, Przywara credits Scheler *ex negativo* for helping him to see the necessity of this doctrine.) What is surprising in this early work, however, is that instead of positing the *analogia entis* against Scheler, Przywara seeks to show that Scheler, too, is implicitly committed to it, indeed, that the *analogia entis* is secretly inscribed at the heart of his (and all) phenomenology. For love, as Scheler himself affirms, entails otherness, which is also why, for

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ See Erich Przywara, "Die Fünf Wenden – Eine Grundlegung" (1930), in *Katholische Krise*, edited Bernhard Gertz (Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1967), 111.

⁶¹ Przywara, *Religionsbegründung*, 4.

⁶² For a review of all the "turns" of this period, see Przywara, "Die Fünf Wenden."

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 42; cf. 53.

⁶⁴ For the best summary account of the connection between the *analogia entis* as a metaphysical doctrine and its spiritual import in terms of fear and love, see Kenneth Oakes, "Three Themes in Przywara's Earlier Thought," *The Thomist* 74, no. 2 (April 2010): 283-310.

Scheler, all genuine mysticism is characterized by a minimum of intentional distance. And so Przywara concludes:

On the whole, therefore, we can say that Scheler's phenomenological analysis of love as love, as well as of the religious act, does not permit one to speak of an "immediate contact" with God-as-love [*Gott-Liebe*]. There remains even between "love" and "God-as-love" the essential distance between Creator and creature, the "inadequacy" of all union, the "intentional distance of existence," as Scheler puts it. But this is nothing other than the "*analogia entis*," which is what we mean by the theological "mediacy" [*Mittelbarkeit*] of the knowledge of God: the creature is similar to God but is nevertheless also dissimilar, God in the creature, but also above the creature.⁶⁵

In other words, for Przywara, even Scheler has to confess a final "tension between 'unity' and 'distance,' 'similar' and 'dissimilar,' which is the essential characteristic of the *analogia entis* as the fundamental theological-philosophical relation between the creature and Creator."⁶⁶ And precisely for this reason, to the extent that we find metaphysics at the heart of Scheler's phenomenology, phenomenology cannot be posed against metaphysics – much less can it be presented following Heidegger (and *mutatis mutandis* Marion) as the overcoming of metaphysics. Rather, as Przywara consistently argues, they go together.⁶⁷

After *Religionsbegründung* Przywara's lengthiest treatment of phenomenology is an article published in 1928, entitled *Three Directions of Phenomenology* [*Drei Richtungen der Phänomenologie*]. The fact that Przywara returned to the topic is not surprising. Heidegger's *Being and Time* had appeared the previous year, which, Przywara observes, "presents contemporary philosophy with choices as consequential as those previously presented by Husserl's *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology* and Scheler's *Material Ethics of Value*."⁶⁸ "But the decision here," he adds, "may prove to be yet more consequential, since it leads to a decision within phenomenology itself."⁶⁹ In other words, the publication of *Being and Time* forced a choice among three possible directions within phenomenology, represented, respectively, by Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger. Let us, therefore, follow suit, taking each of them in turn.

Przywara's reading of Husserl, with whom he had a friendly acquaintance through Edith Stein, is fairly straightforward as he tracks the "inner problematic" of the shifting status of Husserl's bracketing of existence from the *Logical Investigations* (1901) to *Ideas* (1913). Whereas in the early work, the bracketing is more methodological, in the later work it becomes a systematic principle, to the point that pure consciousness assumes the character of "true being," as opposed to the being proper to the sphere of existence. In other words, Husserl moves (obviously enough) increasingly in the direction of idealism, but it is an idealism, Przywara avers, that seeks to do justice to God's

⁶⁵ Przywara, *Religionsbegründung*, 109.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁶⁷ See, for example, Przywara's late essay from 1957, "Phenomenology, Realogy, Relationology," in *Analogia Entis*, 463-79.

⁶⁸ Erich Przywara, "Drei Richtungen der Phänomenologie," *Stimmen der Zeit* 115 (1928): 252.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

transcendence, being characterized by “an almost Old Testament concern for the purity of the idea of God.”⁷⁰

Turning to Scheler, one might think that there is nothing more to say after Przywara’s thorough reckoning with him in *Religionsbegründung*. But by 1928 Scheler’s phenomenology had changed considerably, entering its final phase with the publication in 1926 of *Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*. And, on Przywara’s view, it was not just a change for the worse, but a change so tragic that he speaks of it as a “demonic drama,” in which the “pure values” which formerly possessed an objectivity akin to Platonic forms are reduced to the “power of the drive of life” [*Triebgewalt des Lebens*] in a way that bears comparison to Nietzsche. What is worse, for Przywara, the late Scheler introduces this tragic contradiction into God himself: “In the beginning we have the radiant God of [self-]giving love; in the end, the tragic God of a primal self-contradiction [*der Gott der Ur-Zerrissenheit*].”⁷¹ And so, for Przywara, who had hopes of confirming Scheler in his erstwhile Catholicism, we are left with the personal tragedy of Scheler himself: lacking Husserl’s contemplative instinct for divine transcendence, Przywara laments, he never attained a proper distance vis-à-vis God and was given to a tortured restlessness.⁷² In the end, therefore, he sees the “tragedy” of Scheler’s phenomenology as an “episode” on the way to Heidegger.

While Przywara does not devote any single work to Heidegger, he is nevertheless very aware of him (given Heidegger’s quondam affiliation with the Jesuits, the two are almost alter egos), and was troubled by what his philosophy entailed: firstly, as representing a kind of terminus in phenomenology’s descent from Husserl’s contemplation of essences, which required the bracketing of existence, to the brute facticity of existence, in short, from *Sosein* to *Dasein*. Whereas for Husserl “the problem of truth was ultimately concentrated in the problem of consciousness,” and whereas for Scheler it was ultimately a matter of the being of the life [*Lebens-Sein*] of consciousness, “for Martin Heidegger the being of life becomes the fundamental problem.”⁷³ Admittedly, Przywara says, this is not easy to see because Heidegger conceals his real motives, giving the appearance of being concerned about Being in the spirit of antiquity and scholastic ontology: Heidegger presents “all ‘*veritas in intellectu*’ as the self-actualizing of ‘*veritas ontologica*,’” which is to say all “thinking, valuing, living, etc.” as a “self-expression” [*Sichselbstaussagen*] of Being as it ‘appears through itself.’”⁷⁴ But when all is said and done – after a brief but penetrating analysis of Heidegger’s connection to Dilthey – Przywara contends that all Heidegger’s talk of Being is ultimately a ruse, because what Heidegger means by Being is nothing but the being of the human being. In other words, Heidegger’s philosophy is not a hermeneutics of being in its full dynamic range between essence [*Sosein*] and existence [*Dasein*] opening up to the Being of God, as with the *analogia entis*, but simply a hermeneutics of the brute being-in-the-world of *Dasein*. In short, compared to the *analogia entis*, Heidegger’s ontology is a truncated ontology,

⁷⁰ Ibid., 256.

⁷¹ Ibid., 258.

⁷² Ibid. As it happens, Przywara sent a copy of *Religionsbegründung* to Scheler, but by then it was too late; Scheler had in the meantime read a more polemical Catholic reception of his work by Josef Geysler, *Schelers Phänomenologie der Religion* (Freiburg: Herder, 1924), which, Przywara speculates, may have pushed him over the edge. See Przywara, *In und Gegen: Stellungnahmen zur Zeit* (Nürnberg: Glock und Lutz, 1955), 53f.

⁷³ Przywara, “Die Fünf Wenden,” 111.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

which by reducing the question of essence to the question of existence finally reduces to anthropology.⁷⁵

Przywara's conclusion is thus an ironic one: the very thinker that is ostensibly concerned about the forgotten question of Being has in fact obscured it. And for Przywara, with the closure of the question of essence and of the genuine mystery of creaturely being *between* essence and existence, we also see the religious fate of phenomenology. With Heidegger the light of transcendence that glowed in Husserl and flickered in Scheler is finally extinguished: "With Husserl there was still a final openness to God; with Scheler we already see beginning of the fall into the patent tragedy of the creature that wants to be God, and then in Heidegger the cold-gloomy self-positing into [Nothing]."⁷⁶ Such is the tragic fate of phenomenology as Przywara sees it in 1928: from the contemplative heights of Husserl's *Ideas*, it plunges into the nothingness of existence.

In conclusion, therefore, Przywara appeals once again to Thomas and to the *analogia entis*, as he did previously vis-à-vis Scheler, suggesting that even Heidegger cannot escape it: for the real distinction between essence and existence, informed as it is by Augustine's understanding of the nullity of the creature vis-à-vis God, already comprises the distinction between being and nothingness around which Heidegger's own philosophy turns:

Heidegger's ontology, which tries to present existence, absolutely posited, as the "essence" of being, and thus tries to claim for the creature the essentially divine identity of existence and essence, is ultimately compelled [to return] to the patristic-scholastic doctrine of an ultimate tension between them. For the doctrine of the difference between essence and existence (whether in the Thomistic or the Molinist form) is [...] simply the adequate expression for that tension, which I have already described, between the "is" and the "is not" of the creature [according to Augustine].

In this regard, over against Heidegger, Przywara appeals specifically to the work of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, the Protestant phenomenologist and close friend of Edith Stein, whose phenomenology he sees as overcoming Heidegger from within phenomenology itself. For in her case, too, phenomenology is concerned with the being of life [*Lebens-Sein*], but for Przywara "her gaze penetrates more freely and more keenly [than Heidegger's] into the ultimate 'openness' of creaturely being to what transcends it."⁷⁷ Indeed, he avers, with her the tragedy of phenomenology is brought to a happy end, as it finds its way back to the essential scholastic doctrine "of the ontological openness [*Aufgebrochensein*] of the creature to God, within the inner difference between essence and existence."⁷⁸ And so Przywara concludes his article in a hopeful spirit, suggesting that phenomenology, rather than being opposed to scholastic metaphysics, could actually contribute to it, and thus to the renewal of a genuinely Catholic philosophy:

It is clear, then, how phenomenology can renew scholasticism: namely, when evidence is humbled from within so as to appear as truly creaturely evidence; when

⁷⁵ Ibid., 263.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 262.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 263.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 264.

every vision of truth, in the original spirit of Augustine, is a peering through to God, who alone is Truth; when our vision is finally understood to be provisional, transparent to the divine vision that alone is conclusive; and when, in keeping with this methodological humbling, we see the need for a corresponding metaphysics of being as a metaphysics of becoming that breaks out of itself to God [*Metaphysik aussich-zu-Gott-aufgebrochenen Werdens*]: a metaphysics of the transparency of creaturely “becoming” to the “being” of God, i.e., a metaphysics of the *analogia entis*. Along these lines, the rich yield of phenomenology’s individual analyses in logic (Husserl), anthropology (Scheler, Heidegger), and ontology (Heidegger) betoken a genuine scholasticism in the spirit of Thomas Aquinas.⁷⁹

By 1930, however, in view of the brewing political circumstances, Przywara is less optimistic about phenomenology – at least as far as the rehabilitation of Heidegger goes. Indeed, he is clearly troubled by this “third” direction in phenomenology, which he briefly discusses in a pair of articles published that summer in *Stimmen der Zeit*, entitled, respectively, *Die Neue Zeit* and *End-Zeit*. In the first of these articles, which is more reserved, he writes:

From the outset what Heidegger means by the objectivity of Being is consciously ambiguous. On the one hand, all subjective knowledge and value is subordinated to the purely objective [*sachliche*] “self-giving of Being.” On the other hand, it is the objectivity of a cold, but defiantly heroic sobriety, which leads away from every region of ideal objectivity into the finite region of care and death. The objectivity here is no longer that of “becoming.” It is from the outset a de-idealization [*Entidealisierung*]. It is from the outset a conscious dynamism of the finite human being *in fieri*. It is from the outset a dynamism in the face of unmasked reality: the reality of angst, guilt, despair, and death [...]. The “nothing” that was Scheler’s ruin, is for Heidegger an impetus: “to hold out in the void” in order to “project” oneself into the world...⁸⁰

In the second article, which is more foreboding, even apocalyptic, he portrays Heidegger and Freud as heralds of an impending darkness:

With the words “unmasking” [*Demaskierung*] and “destruction” [*Destruktion*] we have stated the names that are written over our time and into an unclear future: Sigmund Freud and Martin Heidegger. In Freud’s psychological analysis and in Heidegger’s metaphysics of finitude this new time is truly an end-time, i.e., a time that seeks what is ultimate [*das Letzte*] beyond all provisional surfaces – an end in itself proper to time as becoming. But what is this but “nothing”? For in and of itself the creature stands in “nothing”?⁸¹

To be sure, Heidegger understands truth as *aletheia*, which lends his philosophy an aura of objective mystery. For truth as *Unverborgenheit* is precisely the unveiling of something hidden, and thus betokens a kind of revelation. But, Przywara worries, what

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Przywara, *Stimmen der Zeit* 119 (1930): 278f.

⁸¹ Ibid., 349.

is really being uncovered and disclosed in this apocalyptic metaphysics of immanence? At this point Przywara's reading becomes eerie, as if Heidegger's metaphysics is a doorway to darker things hitherto hidden and forgotten: "The way to this forgotten truth is...the 'destruction' of all that lies above it."⁸² And in this respect, he suggests, what we see here is methodologically the same as what we see in Freud's "everyday psychopathology": "the uncovering of the secret depths."⁸³ And all of this, he observes, is presented as a kind of heroism, as a sober look at the realities of life. But it is not simply a heroism of the "cold gaze into nothing." "More horribly," he says, "it is about the heroism of becoming finite [*Verendlichung*], i.e., of *wanting* [...] to be nothing but finite."⁸⁴ In the end, therefore Przywara pointedly asks: what is this heroism that attempts to surpass the heroism of faith but "a shrill 'No': The protest of a will-to-death [*ein Versinken-Wollen*] against the outstretched hand of him who alone strolls over seas and storms?"⁸⁵

In sum, from Przywara's foreboding perspective, as one can gather it from these two articles, Heidegger furnished precisely the kind of philosophy that (in hindsight) could fuel the ideology of National Socialism and, however unwittingly, the death-obsessed ideology of the SS. As he prophetically warned in 1932 in an article that deals in part with Heidegger's metaphysics of "*Innerweltlichkeit*": "In calling for a metaphysics and religion of the folk, of man understood in terms of nature and blood, National Socialism [has] unsealed the abyss. Demons are racing over the earth."⁸⁶ Notably, this was also the year in which Przywara published his *Analogia Entis* as a theocentric antidote for the metaphysical ills of the age, as "a radical humbling of every (ontic) end-in-itself of self and community and of every rounded (noetic) calculation under the sovereignty of God: a *theocentrism* – relativizing all things human – of God in Christ in the Church."⁸⁷

Of course, whether metaphysics alone could ever avert the coming catastrophe is another question. What is significant here is simply that, absent a metaphysics of the *analogia entis*, Przywara considered early twentieth-century philosophy (Scheler, Heidegger) and theology (the *early* Barth) to be in a tragic condition (whereas the former failed to do justice to divine transcendence, the latter failed to do justice to divine immanence), and that a reorientation of philosophy and theology – and of European culture in general – around the God who in Christ is dynamically in-and-beyond creation was crucial to their renewal.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 350.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 351.

⁸⁶ Erich Przywara, "Sein im Scheitern – Sein im Aufgang," in *Stimmen der Zeit* 123 (1932): 152. In the same context Przywara also implicates psychoanalysis.

⁸⁷ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, xxiii.