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## The Good Society

A Comparative Study of Denmark and Switzerland



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## **Preface**

This book is a result of cooperation between economists and political scientists from Switzerland and Denmark. In some respects the two countries have much in common, but in matters of economic and political institutions they are very different. Still we describe both countries as "good societies" characterized by wealth and happiness. This has made a comparative study of the two countries very relevant as well as challenging and fascinating for the researchers.

The book project originated from the Danish association, The Good Society, which is an association set up by interested private sponsors. This association generously financed the project.

The Institute for Political Studies, Cepos, in Copenhagen, has been responsible for the administration of the project.

The responsibility for the book's contents and the points of view expressed as well as the responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation lies naturally exclusively with the authors. The book has been realized in a close cooperation between the researchers, and all the researchers have contributed to all parts of the book. However, the main authors responsible for each chapter are:

Henrik Christoffersen: Chaps. 1 and 12 Michelle Beyeler: Chaps. 6, 7 and 8

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Chaps. 3, 4 and 11

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Finally, it should be mentioned that the first author has done most of the editing.

Copenhagen October 2013 Henrik Christoffersen

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