One of the fundamental principles driving diversity or homogeneity in domains such as cultural differentiation, political affiliation, and product adoption is the tension between two forces: influence (the tendency of people to become similar to others they interact with) and selection (the tendency to be affected most by the behavior of others who are already similar). Influence tends to promote homogeneity within a society, while selection frequently causes fragmentation. When both forces are in effect simultaneously, it becomes an interesting question to analyze which societal outcomes should be expected. <br />In order to study the joint effects of these forces more formally, we analyze a natural model built upon active lines of work in political opinion formation, cultural diversity, and language evolution. Our model posits an arbitrary graph structure describing which "types" of people can influence one another: this captures effects based on the fact that people are only influenced by sufficiently similar interaction partners. In a generalization of the model, we introduce another graph structure describing which types of people even so much as come in contact with each other. These restrictions on interaction patterns can significantly alter the dynamics of the process at the population level. <br />For the basic version of the model, in which all individuals come in contact with all others, we achieve an essentially complete characterization of (stable) equilibrium outcomes and prove convergence from all starting states. For the other extreme case, in which individuals only come in contact with others who have the potential to influence them, the underlying process is significantly more complicated; nevertheless we present an analysis for certain graph structures.

The advancement of various fields of science depends on the actions of individual scientists via the peer review process. The referees' work patterns and stochastic nature of decision making both relate to the particular features of refereeing and to the universal aspects of human behavior. Here, we show that the time a referee takes to write a report on a scientific manuscript depends on the final verdict. The data is compared to a model, where the review takes place in an ongoing competition of completing an important composite task with a large number of concurrent ones - a Deadline -effect. In peer review human decision making and task completion combine both long-range predictability and stochastic variation due to a large degree of ever-changing external "friction".

We study the time evolution of ranking and spectral properties of the Google matrix of English Wikipedia hyperlink network during years 2003 - 2011. The statistical properties of ranking of Wikipedia articles via PageRank and CheiRank probabilities, as well as the matrix spectrum, are shown to be stabilized for 2007 - 2011. A special emphasis is done on ranking of Wikipedia personalities and universities. We show that PageRank selection is dominated by politicians while 2DRank, which combines PageRank and CheiRank, gives more accent on personalities of arts. The Wikipedia PageRank of universities recovers 80 percents of top universities of Shanghai ranking during the considered time period.

The following fundamental properties are proved to be true if a financial market is exhaustive: (i) Every event which is measurable by the price history at time T is independent of G_t conditional on the current price history H_t, where G_t is a superset of H_t, (ii) every event which is measurable by G_t is independent of H_T conditional on H_t. These properties are especially useful for asset valuation, portfolio optimization and risk management. An exhaustive market with respect to {F_t} is free of dominance and there are no free lunches with vanishing risk under {F_t}. Moreover, it is complete with respect to every information flow which is contained in {F_t} and the growth-optimal portfolio at time t is only determined by the past asset prices. This means any other information which is contained in F_t and available to the investor at time t is irrelevant.

We introduce a simple agent-based model which allows us to analyze three stylized facts: a fat-tailed size distribution of companies, a `tent-shaped' growth rate distribution, the scaling relation of the growth rate variance with firm size, and the causality between them. This is achieved under the simple hypothesis that firms compete for a scarce quantity (either aggregate demand or workforce) which is allocated probabilistically. The model allows us to relate size and growth rate distributions. We compare the results of our model to simulations with other scaling relationships, and to similar models and relate it to existing theory.

Financial markets are prominent examples for highly non-stationary systems. Sample averaged observables such as variances and correlation coefficients strongly depend on the time window in which they are evaluated. This implies severe limitations for approaches in the spirit of standard equilibrium statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. Nevertheless, we show that there are similar generic features which we uncover in the empirical return distributions for whole markets. We explain our findings by setting up a random matrix model.

The probability distribution of number of ties of an individual in a social network follows a scale-free power-law. However, how this distribution arises has not been conclusively demonstrated in direct analyses of people's actions in social networks. Here, we perform a causal inference analysis and find an underlying cause for this phenomenon. Our analysis indicates that heavy-tailed degree distribution is causally determined by similarly skewed distribution of human activity. Specifically, the degree of an individual is entirely random - following a "maximum entropy attachment" model - except for its mean value which depends deterministically on the volume of the users' activity. This relation cannot be explained by interactive models, like preferential attachment, since the observed actions are not likely to be caused by interactions with other people.

How much did a network change since yesterday? How different is the wiring between Bob's brain (a left-handed male) and Alice's brain (a right-handed female)? Graph similarity with known node correspondence, i.e. the detection of changes in the connectivity of graphs, arises in numerous settings. In this work, we formally state the axioms and desired properties of the graph similarity functions, and evaluate when state-of-the-art methods fail to detect crucial connectivity changes in graphs. We propose DeltaCon, a principled, intuitive, and scalable algorithm that assesses the similarity between two graphs on the same nodes (e.g. employees of a company, customers of a mobile carrier). Experiments on various synthetic and real graphs showcase the advantages of our method over existing similarity measures. Finally, we employ DeltaCon to real applications: (a) we classify people to groups of high and low creativity based on their brain connectivity graphs, and (b) do temporal anomaly detection in the who-emails-whom Enron graph.

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.

Modern ICT (Information and Communication Technology) has developed a vision where the "computer" is no longer associated with the concept of a single device or a network of devices, but rather the entirety of situated services originating in a digital world, which are perceived through the physical world. It is observed that services with explicit user input and output are becoming to be replaced by a computing landscape sensing the physical world via a huge variety of sensors, and controlling it via a plethora of actuators. The nature and appearance of computing devices is changing to be hidden in the fabric of everyday life, invisibly networked, and omnipresent, with applications greatly being based on the notions of context and knowledge. Interaction with such globe spanning, modern ICT systems will presumably be more implicit, at the periphery of human attention, rather than explicit, i.e. at the focus of human attention. Socio-inspired ICT assumes that future, globe scale ICT systems should be viewed as social systems. Such a view challenges research to identify and formalize the principles of interaction and adaptation in social systems, so as to be able to ground future ICT systems on those principles. This position paper therefore is concerned with the intersection of social behaviour and modern ICT, creating or recreating social conventions and social contexts through the use of pervasive, globe-spanning, omnipresent and participative ICT.